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MARRIED WOMAN'S RIGHT TO HER MAIDEN NAME:
THE POSSIBILITIES FOR CHANGE
INTRODUCTION

A story is... told of a stranger who sought out a fisherman
named Alexander White but did not know either his nickname
or house. He asked a girl:
Could you tell me fa'r (where) Sammy Fite lives?
Filk (which) Sammy Fite?
Muckle (Big) Sammy Fite.

Filk muckle Sammy Fite?
Muckle lang Sammy Fite.
Filk muckle lang Sammy Fite?
Muckle lang gleyed (squinting) Sammy Fite.

Oh. Its Goup the lift (Stare at the Sky) ye're
seeking, said the girl and fat the deevil for
dinna ye speer (inquire) for the man by his
richt name at ance?1
The subject of names is fascinating and, as the above anecdote indicates, often amusing. Names do have a function aside from fascination and amusement. As demonstrated by this story, that function is
one of identification. Although in today's populous society, government agencies and bureaus tend to use numbers in place of names,
we are still identified by our friends, relatives, acquaintances-our
community-by our names.
This article will deal with names and with the state's right to
regulate their use. The discussion will specifically focus on the married woman's right to retain her maiden name and how various courts
and administrative agencies have limited this right. It will be argued that the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution can provide a safeguard for the married woman's right to
choose her own name.
I. NAMES AT

COMMON LAW AND AT PRESENT

Present laws regulating the use of names have their origin in
the common law traditions of early England.
As the common law rests so largely upon the customs of the
1. W. BOWMiAN, THE STORY OF NAMES 19-20 (1931).
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people, it is often necessary to search the history of remote periods,
both in England and in this country, in order to learn its full scope
and meaning. While the legal name of a person now consists of a
given name ... and a surname ... history shows that this was not
always the case. In the early life of all races surnames were unknown,
while given names have been used from the most distant times to2
identify and distinguish a particular individual from his fellows.

It is clear that the original function of names was identification. As
population increased, the taking of a second name to facilitate identification was introduced. This occurred sometime after the Norman
Conquest of England in 1066, 3 but the practice did not spread
rapidly.4 Not until the time of Edward II did the surname evolve into
a custom.5 It was established at common law that anyone could assume
a surname through the mere use of it, providing there was no ulterior
motive to defraud.6 This right was recognized by the courts of our
country, even after statutes detailing procedures for a formal change
7
of name were enacted.
The married woman's right to be identified by her maiden name
varies from state to state. This is partially due to disagreement among
authorities as to what the applicable common law is. Some authorities
insist that although taking the husband's name was customary, it was
2. Smith v. United States Cas. Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 423, 90 N.E. 947, 948 (1910).
3. W. BOWMAN, THE STORY OF NAmES 5 (1931). Mr. Bowman continues:
This significant change was not brought about solely by the invasion, for it
was a movement that was already spreading through the more populous countries of Europe. The rise of the large towns, and the growing populations in
country districts made it increasingly difficult to identify an individual who
bore only one name.

Id.
4. Id. at 8-9. "The peasant of the Middle Ages, unlettered and ignorant, who
owed his daily bread to the favour of his overlord, looked with dread and suspicion on
new customs." Id.
5. Id. at 7.
6. In the case of In re Snook, 2 Hilt. 566 (C.P.N.Y. 1859), First Judge Daly
stated "there is nothing in the law prohibiting a man from taking another name if he
chooses. There is no penalty or punishment for so doing, nor any consequence growing
out of it, except so far as it may lead to or cause a confounding of his identity." Id. at
572.
7. In Laflin & Rand Co. v. Steytler, 146 Pa. 434, 23 A. 215 (1892), the court
stated:
The legislature in 1852 provided a mode of changing the name, but that
act was in affirmance and aid of the common law ....
But without the aid
of that act a man may change his name or names, first or last, and when his
neighbors and the community have acquiesced and recognized him by his
new designation, that becomes his name.
Id. at 442, 23 A. at 217.
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always optional.8 Others claim that the common law treated the
husband's surname as the married woman's legal name. 9 Support for
the latter usage was based on the premise that the feme covert and
her husband were but one person in law; therefore, a single name
should designate this unit, the name of the husband.
Depending upon the theory on which a state relies, certain rights
and/or disabilities follow. As was noted above, at common law there
was a right to adopt a new surname merely by using it. If a married
woman is not obligated to take her husband's name, her rights to her
name are necessarily the same as that of any other person; that is,
she can change it through usage. But, if a married woman is obligated
to adopt her husband's surname as her legal name, she may not regain
the right to use her maiden name extrajudicially.
Formal procedures for changing names are available in some
states. 10 However, even in jurisdictions where it is possible to regain
one's maiden name, it may still be questioned why "a woman [should
be] subjected to the expenses of filing fees, probable attorney's fees, and
court appearances, merely to assert a right that is her husband's automatically-the right to retain her own name after marriage." 1 In
8. M. TURNER-SAMUELS, THE LAw OF MARIED WOMEN 345 (1957). The
author states:
In England, custom has long since ordained that a married woman takes her
husband's name. This practice is not invariable; nor compellable ....
A wife may continue to use her maiden, married, or any other name she
wishes to be known by.
Id. State ex rel. Krupa v. Green, 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (1961) states:
It is only by custom, in English speaking countries, that a woman, upon
marriage, adopts the surname of her husband in place of the surname of her
father. The State of Ohio follows this custom but there exists no law compelling
it.
Id. at 501, 177 N.E.2d at 619.
9. In Chapman v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 85 N.Y. 437 (1881), it was stated:
For several centuries, by the common law among all English speaking people,
a woman, upon her marriage, takes her husband's surname. That becomes her
legal name, and she ceases to be known by her maiden name ....
Her maiden
surname is absolutely lost, and she ceases to be known thereby.
Id. at 449. In the recent case of People ex tel. Rago v. Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 63
N.E.2d 642 (1945) the court stated:
[I]t is well settled by common-law principles and immemorial custom that a
woman upon marriage abandons her maiden name and take the husband's
surname ....
Id. at 67, 63 N.E.2d at 644. Accord, Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala.
1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 970 (1972); In re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y.
1934) ; Bacon v. Boston Elevated Ry., 256 Mass. 30, 152 N.E. 35 (1926).
10. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. R. LAW, § 60 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
11. Hughes, And Then There Were Two, 23 HAsTINGS L.J. 233, 239 (1971).
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other states the requirement that a woman be known by her husband's surname is absolute. Iowa, for example, excludes married
women from the coverage of a statute permitting a change of name
through formal procedures:
Any person at least eighteen (18) years of age, who is not a marlied woman, may have his name changed by the county court of
the county in which he resides.' 2
Statutory limitations on married women's rights to their names
are not the only factors which operate against equal rights. Judicial
decisions and administrative regulations reflect certain biases which
contribute to existing inequities.

II.

NAMES AND THE JUDICIARY-DIFFERING METHODS OF ANALYSIS

Although the notion of the court as an impartial arbiter of facts in
issue is sacrosanct in American law, this ideal is often not achieved.13
Discriminatory attitudes are frequently implicit in the judicial consciousness and many times are exemplified by the court's method of
analysis. A series of cases from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts between 1913 and 1939 illustrates how judicial attitude and
method of analysis can result in a requirement that a woman adopt
her husband's name. In construing the identification requirements of
an apparently neutral automobile registration statute, 14 the court
established a method of analysis which distinguished cases involving
married women's names from all other cases. The method precluded
a decision on the "merits" and made the outcome solely dependent upon
what the court dictated were the rights of married women. This
12. Law of April 6, 1904, ch. 127, § 2, [1904] Iowa Laws 118. Kentucky has a
similar provision:
Any person at least eighteen [18] years of age, who not a married woman,
may have his name changed by the county court of the county in which he

resides.
Ky. REv. STAT. § 401.010 (1969).
13. For an interesting discussion of judicial bias, see Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 675, 741-46
(1971).
14. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 90, § 2 (1969).
The application [for registration of motor vehicles] shall contain, in addition to
such other particulars as may be required by the registrar, a statement of the
name, place of residence and address of the applicant ....

Id. This is essentially unchanged from the version alluded to by the court in Crompton
v. Williams, 216 Mass. 184, 103 N.E. 298 (1913).
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method contrasted with the identification test used by the court in
cases which did not involve married women. For example, in Crompton v. Williams15 the court upheld the validity of an automobile
registration by finding that the legal name of the owner was not required because registration under a company's tradename resulted in
reasonable identification. This standard was also applied in Bridges v.
Hart' where Theophilus Doucette registered his car under the name of
Thomas Douey even though Doucette was the name appearing on all
his other legal documents. Despite the fact that Doucette was his
legal name, the court found he was identifiable in his community as
Douey and therefore held that the automobile was legally registered.
7
The court, in Topf v. Holland1
emphasized its concern with identification:
Variations from the literal terms of the statute not affecting in
material particulars this purpose of identification do not invalidate
the registration or render the motor vehicle an outlaw on the
8
highway.'
Other cases not involving married women, in which the court
found vehicle registration to be void, followed the same method of
analysis. When a truck owned by a partnership was registered under
the name of one of the partners, the court determined that the owners
of the vehicle were not readily identifiable and concluded that the
truck was illegally registered. 19

This pattern of analyzing the facts and applying them to the "requirements" of the statute had been rather consistent; the case of
Bacon v. Boston Elevated Railway Co. 20 was an exception. When Alice
Willard married in 1921, she adopted her husband's surname of
Bacon by which she was thereafter known in the community. In 1923
she registered her automobile under the name of Alice Willard. With
these facts and the established method of analysis, the court could
and should have found the registration invalid because Alice was not
known by the surname Willard. The court found the registration
invalid but did not employ the identification test; instead it decided
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

216 Mass. 184, 103 N.E. 298 (1913).
302 Mass. 239, 18 N.E.2d 1020 (1939).
288 Mass. 552, 193 N.E. 364 (1934).
Id. at 554, 193 N.E. at 365.
Kilduff v. Boston Elevated Ry., 247 Mass. 453, 142 N.E. 98 (1924).
256 Mass. 30, 152 N.E. 35 (1926).
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that a married woman's legal name was her husband's surname, and
voided the registration for failure to use the legal name.
It is important to note that the court had sufficient facts to analyze the case under the identification test. Instead, the fact that Alice
Bacon was not known as Alice Willard served merely as background
information and the decision rested solely on the determination that
Willard was not Alice's legal name. It should be recalled that in
Bridges the court rejected the notion that use of a non-legal name
could result in the invalidation of a vehicle's registration. The impact
of Bacon lies not only in its holding, but in the court's lack of concern for the particular factual situation of the case. It follows from
the holding that if Alice Bacon had indeed been known by her
maiden name of Willard, the outcome would have been the same.
Apparently, to the court, the use of any name other than the husband's was inherently misleading.
Unfortunately, Bacon cannot be dismissed as an insignificant decision. Although it can be argued that the court's decision is deficient
analytically, it has grown in importance and is cited frequently as
authority for the proposition that married women must take their
21
husbands' names.
An interesting comparison is provided by Koley v. Williams,2 2
decided by the same court just three years after Bacon. Once again,
a married woman did not use her legal name in registering her
automobile, but this time she identified too closely with her husband.
The woman registered her car under the name of Mrs. John P. Wil'Jams instead of her legal name of Ethel M. Williams. The court relied
cin the identification test and found the registration valid.
As matter of law the legal name of the defendant . . . was Ethel M.

Williams.... But it does not follow that, because the motor car was
registered in the name of Mrs. John P. Williams, it was illegally
registered....
She [defendant] registered her vehicle in the name adopted by
her.... She could easily be identified, and the purpose of the statute
23
was complied with.
21. See, -e.g., People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 327 Il1. App. 63, 68, 63 N.E.2d 642,
644 (1945) ; 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 72 (1969).
22. 265 Mass. 601, 164 N.E. 444 (1929).
23. Id. at 602-03, 164 N.E. at 444-45.
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This series of cases is significant in that it reveals how a biased
attitude can result in judicially sanctioned deprivation of rights. In
the Bacon case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Masachusetts abandoned its previous methodology in holding that a married woman
could have only one legal name, that of her husband.

III.

AGENCIES-THE DANGERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

Since many of the recent cases involving married women's names
revolve around administrative rules and regulations, it is essential to
examine the practice of administrative agencies. In regulating particular legal rights the executive branch of our government may inevitably affect rights tangential to the subject of regulation. This happens
most frequently in administrative agencies which require registration in order for an individual to exercise his "rights" or to participate in certain activities.
In People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky 24 a voter registration statute
mandated that "any registered voter who changes his or her name by
"25 The
marriage or otherwise, shall be required to register anew ....
trial judge interpreted the statute to mean that unless a newly married
woman chose to regard her name as having been changed by marriage,
it was not necessary for her to reregister. 26 Both the Board of Election
Commissioners and the Appellate Court of Illinois felt such an interpretation of the requirements of the statute would "promote fraud and
confusion."2 7 They found that a woman automatically changes her name
upon marriage (citing Bacon among others) and therefore must regis28
ter under her husband's name.
29
In contrast to the above case, State ex rel. Krupa v. Green,
an Ohio case, displays a far more sensible interpretation of a similar
statute. The Board of Elections decided that a woman who does not
change her name at the time of marriage is not required to reregister.
A taxpayer objected to this interpretation and moved for a writ of
24. 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945).
25. Id. at 66, 63 N.E.2d at 643.

26. Id. at 70, 63 N.E.2d at 645.
27. Id. at 72, 63 N.E.2d at 646.
28. The court added, "It is well settled that the right to vote is conditional and
can be exercised only upon compliance with statutory requirements." Id. at 71, 63 N.E.2d
at 645.
29.

114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (1961).
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prohibition against the Board for not removing a married woman who
used her maiden name in her Statement of Candidacy and Nominating Petition from a list of candidates for public office. The writ was
denied. A concurring judge stated:
The [Ohio candidacy registration statutes] are to prevent misrepresentation to the voters by a change of name, but there are no statutes
seeking to regulate the continued use of a name by which a person has
been identified over a long period of time (in this case all of her life)
and by which he is known in the community.3 0
In other words, the Board could police its registration of voters and
candidates merely by requiring a consistent use of one name and
notification if the name was changed.
Obtaining a driver's license, though not a right, is often a necessity. Generally, once fees are paid and tests passed, a license will be
issued. Valid reasons for not issuing a license include prior incidents
of reckless driving, drunken driving and the like, all of which assure
the public's safety. It is somewhat more difficult to ascertain what
public purpose is served by requiring married women who are identified by their maiden names to apply for licenses in their husbands'
surnames. Nevertheless, the court upheld such a requirement in Forbush v. Wallace.31 At issue was the constitutionality of an unwritten
regulation of the Alabama Department of Public Safety, requiring all
married women who applied for driver's licenses to use their husbands' names. Wendy Forbush was married to Ronald Carver but
continued to use her maiden name. When she applied for a license
in her own name, it was denied. She sued, claiming a denial of equal
protection. The court held the regulation valid partly under the rationale that a married woman may be compelled to use her husband's
surname for purposes of administrative efficiency. 32 The court stated
plainly that which could be inferred from the Lipsky case: "confusion ... could result if each driver were allowed to obtain licenses
in any number of names he desired . . . ,,33 "Confusion" could certainly have been avoided by a requirement that each person apply
in the name she uses consistently, a point that was obvious to the
Ohio Board of Elections in Krupa. In no way could this procedure
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 507, 177 N.E.2d 622 (Skeel, J., concurring).
341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
341 F. Supp. at 222.
Id.
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create inefficiency in the maintenance of driving records or problems
in the identification of a driver, both concerns of the court.
In Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections34 the court specifically rejected the Board's arguments that allowing married women
to register and vote under their maiden names results in confusion
and that proper record keeping and expediency in identifying people
necessitates that a married woman use her husband's surname. The
court ordered the Board to restore the plaintiff's maiden name to the
registry of voters. Furthermore, the court stated that if the Board
believed fraudulent registration would become a problem, it would
be incumbent upon them to establish a system of cross-references.3 5
Administrative efficiency has not always been deemed to be of
such paramount interest in other contexts. In situations where children of divorced parents live with the mother and her new husband,
the household generally has two surnames, the children's (their
father's), and the mother's by her new husband. Though this can
cause administrative inefficiency, that inefficiency is seen to be subordinate to the presently recognized right of a father to have his
children bear his surname. Thus, in most states when a divorced
woman who has custody of her children remarries and attempts to
change the children's last name to conform to the mother's new
married name, the father of the children has a right to prevent her
from doing so.36
A. Agency Efficiency and Race: An Analogy
The Forbush case demonstrates that discrimination justified by
administrative efficiency is sometimes tolerated by the courts. The
discrimination can be subtle, and administrators should constantly
reassess agency procedures and rulings in lights of this possibility. The
danger of discrimination on the basis of race has been recognized by
William Boyer,37 who has urged that administrative agencies owe a
duty to the individuals they serve to insure that the forms they use
do not discriminate between classes of applicants. He discusses a
former requirement of Wisconsin administrative agencies that persons designate their race on application forms. Although designation
34. 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972).
35. Id. at 450, 295 A.2d at 228.
36. Trower v. Trower, 260 Cal. App. 2d 75, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1st Dist. 1968).

37. W.

BOYER, BUREAUCRACY ON TRIAL

127-29 (1964).
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of race may greatly aid in identification, Mr. Boyer felt this practice
might be discriminatory and therefore should be ended.
Most forms used by administrative agencies relate to application . . . Many agencies require that various forms be completed
as prerequisites for administrative consideration of action sought by
the applicants. Usually, the action involves some benefit or other
type of agency consent. Accordingly, forms constitute agency information and occasionally contain statements of general policy or otherwise add to statutory requirements.
It is elementary to a proper concept of equity of justice that
agency policies, including those made known by forms, should not
be discriminating in their terms or application.3s
The Wisconsin requirement had some rational basis since identification could have been facilitated by the designation of race. Notwithstanding the Forbush decision, requiring registration under a
name by which the individual is not known serves no discernible purpose. Since designation of race can lead to racial discrimination, the
value of avoiding such discrimination has been deemed to outweigh
the value of facilitating identification. 3 Similarly, the claim that
greater agency efficiency will result if married women are identified
by their husbands' name should be rejected even assuming, arguendo,
that agency efficiency would be promoted. The value of allowing an
individual's sense of identification to remain intact should be of overriding importance, especially where identification of these individuals is not aided by the requirement that they adopt their husbands' surnames.
B. Agency Rulemaking and the Courts
Where administrators enforce rules and regulations that discriminate, the courts should be willing to intervene. At present, both
administrative rules and regulations are generally upheld if they
meet a rational relation test, the same test applied to legislation. 40
However, legislation is enacted by elected representatives who are
subject to voter sensibilities and who presumably act upon proposed
legislation only after examining it and carefully weighing its merits.
Whatever the faults of the legislative system, they are magnified where
an agency is concerned. Administrators are not elected, and enjoy
38. Id. at 127-28.
39. This practice has since been halted. See id. at 128.
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wide "discretion" in performing duties seldom subjected to public
scrutiny.
The comments of scholars in administrative law illustrate the
potential for abuse in discretionary rulemaking. They raise serious
questions as to whether courts should give administrative decisions
as much weight as they many times do.
Professor Frank Newman 41 is skeptical of administrators' claims
that certain practices are vital to the agency's effective operation.
I am . . . influenced by the fact that administrators too often have
cried "Wolf, Wolf." Too often . . . have government attorneys
pleaded that to grant rights requested by the complainants would
wreck their agency's program-when, following defeat in court, it
becomes obvious that the threats were posh. . . . And how inadequate, empirically, have been their hundreds of awful-consequence
predictions regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of government
42
business.
John M. Pfiffner and Robert Presthus43 suggest that there are
many barriers to rational decisionmaking, including "ignorance,
prejudice, lack of information . . . and our inability to conceptualize
and trace through the consequences of various alternative means to a
desired end." 44 The possibilities then, are viewed introspectively, with
either total disregard for alternatives (reasoning after the decision)
or failure to see them at all. Pfiffner and Presthus claim that "[e]mpirical research . . . shows that actual decision making is often characterized by a premature shutting out of alternatives. . . . The search
' 45
for other, perhaps superior, alternative ends.
Kenneth Culp Davis, 46 on the contrary, wholeheartedly believes
in the importance of maintaining administrative "discretion." In
his opinion, the United States does not and should not "have a rule
of law which requires decisions to be made by the application of
known principles or laws: [but] allow[s] many decisions to be discre40. See Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd mem., 405

U.S. 970 (1972).
41. Newman, The Process of Prescribing "Due Process," 49 CALIF. L. REv. 215

(1961)'.
42. Id. at 230-31.
43. J. PFIFFNER & R.
44. Id. at 111.

PRESTHUS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

45. Id.

46. K. DAvis,

DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE

21 (1971).
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tionary." 47 Of course, he also maintains that such discretionary power

should be eliminated whenever undue sacrifice of other values may
be deemed more important. 48 Discretionary power apparently fulfills a function similar to that of the concept of equity at common law.
"Discretion is indispensable for individualized justice, for creative
justice

. ..

Eliminating discretionary power would paralyze govern-

mental processes and would stifle individualized justice." 49
If used by agencies in the ideal sense this discretionary power
would be of inestimable value and conceivably would be the "lifeblood of the administrative process."' 0 "Experts" would be able to
creatively deal with problems in fields where courts have little expertise. Yet, as the above critics have indicated, discretionary power is
generally not exercised in its most desirable form and courts should
consider this problem when reviewing agency regulations.
It is this writer's view that courts should abandon the traditional presumption of acceptability when assessing the legality of an
administrative ruling or regulation and adopt a more critical method
of review. This should be the practice even when a ruling or regulation is not patently discriminatory for it may embody a traditional
assumption about the status of the class affected and thereby be subtly
discriminatory when put into effect.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A MARRIED WOMAN'S
RIGHT TO HER NAME

A. ProceduralDue Process
Mr. Justice Stone observed that there is a violation of procedural due process when there exists "wholesale condemnation of a class
involving an invasion of personal liberty but no opportunity to any
47. Id. at 29.
48. Id. at 30.
49. Id. at 216-17. Professor Maurice Rosenberg also sees this relationship between
discretion and equity-he calls it "flexibility."
Flexibility permits more compassionate and more sensitive responses to differences which ought to count in applying legal norms, but which get buried in
the gross and rounded-off language of rules that are directed at wholesale
problems instead of particular disputes. Discretion in this sense allows the
individualization of law and permits justice at times to be hand-made instead
of mass-produced.
Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRAoUSE
L. REv. 635, 642 (1971).
50. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 21 (1971).
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individual to show his is not the type of case which would justify
resort to it."'51 Thus, if a statute is passed for a particular purpose, a
person found in violation of that statute should be allowed an opportunity to demonstrate that, as applied to him, the statute does not
serve its avowed purpose.
To be compelled to use a name which is not one's own, or to
change one's name because a governmental body believes this to be
necessary, is a deprivation of personal liberty. If the governmental
body has established a statute or regulation for the avowed purpose
of making identification more certain, as in Forbush, Stuart, Krupa,
and Lipsky, anyone found in violation of it should be given an opportunity to defend on the basis that application of the law would not
result in more accurate identification, but rather would engender confusion.
B. Equal Protection
The rational relation test is based upon the requirement that
[a statutory classification] must always rest upon some difference
which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to
which the classification is proposed,
and can never be made arbi52
trarily and without any such basis.
This test has been applied much less stringently in Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co. 53 and McDonald v. Board of Election Commis-

sioners,r4 than in Reed v. Reed.55 In Williamson and McDonald anything the Court could think of to justify the legislation was acceptable.
In Reed, however, the Court required close examination of the
statute's purpose in relation to the importance of the freedoms it infringed. The former application of this test is known as the "Old"
test; the latter application is known as the "New" test. 50
The "Old" rational relation test is marked by an amazing deference to legislative enactments. As Chief Justice Warren stated:
Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even if source
materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for ac51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
(1972).

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942) (concurring opinion).
Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
394 U.S. 802 (1969).
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
See Gunther, Foreword: The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1
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tion are otherwise silent, and their statutory classification will be
set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify themY
Apparently, under this test, any rational justification will be sufficient to sustain the statute. Thus, there is frequent resort in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. to language like "[t]he legislature might
have concluded,"5 8 and various other "mays" and "mights."' 9
It is not surprising that under the "Old" test the Supreme Court
upheld statutes which permitted sex as a valid classification. In Muller
v. Oregon, the Court stated, "[woman] is properly placed in a classification by herself."6 0 Since then, this statement has served as a modus
operandi for the courts. 61 Therefore, when a statute which made a
distinction between the sexes was before the Court, all the Court
needed to do was state that classification by sex was reasonable for
2
the requirements of the "Old" rational relation test to be satisfied.
This lax test applied to women's issues leads to the following criticism:
The Supreme Court has stated that a woman is a person, but has
held, with only rare exceptions, that sex alone is a valid basis for
classification and, therefore, has not extended to women the equal
03
protection due "to any person" under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The "Old" test was not applied in every instance, however. The
Court soon developed a higher standard which required the state to
show a "compelling interest" wherever a statute dealt with a "suspect classification" or impinged on a "fundamental interest."
Thus far the Supreme Court has not held sex to be a suspect
57. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
58. 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
59. Id. at 487-91.
60. 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908).
61. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60-64 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464, 465 (1948); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 394-95 (1937).
62. For a good example of this type of thinking, see Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948). In that case Mr. Justice Frankfurter found nothing wrong in a classification based on sex, but if within such a classification members are treated differently,
then the statute must bear a rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal.
While Michigan may deny to all women opportunities for bartending,
Michigan cannot play favorites among women without rhyme or reason. The
Constitution in enjoining the equal protection of the laws upon States precludes irrational discrimination as between persons or groups in the incidence of a law.
Id. at 466. See L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAw, 154 (1969).
63. Lexcen, The Equal Rights Amendment, 31 FED. B.J. 247, 249 (1972).
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classification. However, there is ample justification for the Court to
do so. It has been suggested that two of the most important criteria
used to determine whether a classification is suspect are whether an
individual is born into the classification and whether there are
"unique historical considerations" to be taken into account.64 'Obviously humans are born either male or female. "Unique historical
considerations," a phrase often used in reference to racial discrimination, is peculiarly applicable to women, especially married women. 65
It was only married women who were subject to coverture at common law, thereby losing their social and legal identity. American
courts adopted many of the common law notions of a woman's status.
For example, in upholding discrimination against women in Goesaert
v. Cleary0 the Supreme Court specifically relied upon old notions of
coverture and asserted that the Constitution did not require a change
in the Court's traditional view of women and their role in society.
The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men
have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices
that men have long practiced, does not preclude the States from
drawing a sharp line between sexes ....The Constitution does not
require legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social
standards ....

17

Even at the time Goesaert was decided (1948), some members
of the Supreme Court felt that sexual classifications should be suspect.
Mr. Justice Rutledge, in his dissenting opinion (joined by Justices
Douglas and Murphy), stated that the equal protection clause "does
require lawmakers to refrain from invidious distinctions of the sort
drawn by the statute challenged in this case [which distinguished
between male and female bar owners]."' 8 More recently four mem64. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 489 (1970)

(Harlan, J., concurring);

Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1107 (1969).

65. The relationship between sex and race discrimination is discussed in Cavanagh,
"A Little Dearer Than His Horse": Legal Stereotypes and the Feminine Personality,

6 IARv. Crv. RIGHTs-CrY. LIB. L. REV. 260 (1971); Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: a Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 675 (1971);
Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34

GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 232 (1965).
66. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
67. Id. at 466. In the more recent case White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D.
Ala. 1966), the district court viewed the Constitution in a drastically different light.
"It is . . .this Court's function to apply the Constitution as a living document to the
legal cases and controversies of contemporary society." Id. at 408.
68. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 468 (1948).
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bers of the Supreme Court expressly stated that sex should be regarded as a suspect classification.
[W]e can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently
suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.09
The Supreme Court of California has also concluded that "sexual
classifications are properly treated as suspect . .

.

.

-70 Many authori-

ties have intimated that classification by sex should be suspect. "The
difficulty in asserting women's rights lies not in the limited reach of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but in the failure of the courts to isolate and analyze the discriminatory aspect of differential treatment
71
based on sex."
If the state must show a "compelling interest," could an administrative efficiency argument ever satisfy this requirement? The Supreme Court dealt with this issue in Frontiero v. Richardson,72 where
a servicewoman brought suit claiming sex discrimination when her
application for medical and dental benefits for her husband was denied. There was no doubt that a serviceman's application for his
wife would have been routinely granted. The government conceded
that the only justification for this differential treatment was administrative convenience. The Court took a hard look at the government's claim and saw no "concrete evidence" that the differential
treatment saved the government any money, stating explicitly that the
government's explanation of the scheme was "questionable. 73 Moreover, the Court stated:
In any case, . . . although efficacious administration of governmental programs is not without some importance, "the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency." . . . And when
we enter the realm of "strict judicial scrutiny," there can be no doubt
69. Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S.Ct. 1764 (1973).
70. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
71. Murray & Eastwood, supra note 65, at 238. See Bayh, The Need for the
Equal Rights Amendment, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 80 (1972); Brown, Emerson, Fall' &
Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for
Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971); Krauskopf, Sex Discrimination-AnotherShibboleth
Legally Shattered, 37 Mo. L. REv. 377 (1972); Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment: Some Problems of Construction, 6 HARV. Civ. RiOHTS-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 243
(1971);
72. 93 S.Ct. 1764 (1973).
73. Id. at 1771-72.
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that "administrative convenience" is not a shibboleth, the mere recita-

tion of which dictates constitutionality.7 4

The "New" rational relation test requires a close analysis of the
purpose of the statute. Professor Gunther has posited that under the
"New" test "the Court would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its imagination. It would . ..assess the means

in terms of legislative purposes that have a substantial basis in ac'75
tuality not merely in conjecture.
In Reed v. Reed,76 the Court applied the higher standards of the
"New" test to a statute which favored males as administrators of the
estates of intestate decedents. The Court did not merely ask if the
classification by sex was rational, rather it asked whether classification by sex served the purpose of the statute. The Court found the
statute to be arbitrary and unreasonable as it discriminated on the
basis of sex without regard to the relative capabilities of the competing applicants. The state argued that the statute aided the probate
court and precluded family arguments by establishing who was to
be appointed administrator. The Court rejected these propositions
stating:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings
on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in 77this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.
If, indeed, the naming provisions of the previously discussed rules,
regulations, and statutes are for identification purposes, then application of the "New" rational relation test will necessarily result
in the Court's inquiry as to whether identification is facilitated by
these rules or whether a provision that all persons consistently use
one name is an equally useful aid to identification and less discriminatory.
Since the Supreme Court's approach to classification by sex is
unstated, a discussion of an alternative method is in order. This is the
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Gunther, supranote 56, at 20.
404U.S. 71 (1971).
Id. at 76-77.
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method of assuring some relief from unequal treatment under the proposed Equal Rights Amendment which would forbid discrimination
on the basis of sex.
V. THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT

Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the
date of ratification.78

The Equal Rights Amendment, if ratified, may provide an additional legal basis for striking down statutes and regulations which
require married women to adopt their husbands' surnames. A precise
assessment of the impact of the amendment must await its adoption
and its construction by the courts; however, authorities believe that
there are at least two ways in which the amendment might be construed.
The first possibility is that the amendment will make sex a suspect classification, thereby shifting the burden to the state to show a
"compelling interest" in support of sex-based legislation. Professor
Leo Kanowitz originally argued that the amendment was not needed
because sex was likely to become suspect anyway.79 He has since recanted and, in his testimony before the United States Senate Judiciary
Committee, he supported the amendment. Kanowitz now believes that
there is no guarantee that sex classification will continue to be regarded as suspect and therefore an amendment is needed which would
protect against sex-based discrimination. 0 Professor Kurland sees the
amendment as useless because women are sufficiently protected by
the fact that classification by sex is suspect or invidious. 8' If these
78. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
79. L. KANOWITZ, supra note 62, at 155-56.
80. Hearings on S.j. Res. 61 & S.1. Res. 231 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 174-75 (1970). A similar discussion is found in
Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 IHARv. Civ. RroHTS-Oiv. Lin.
L. REv. 234 (1971).
81. Kurland, supra note 71, at 247.

COMMENTS

persons are correct, name requirements based on sex should fall for
the reasons previously set forth in the discussion of suspect classification.
A second possibility is that the amendment will make sex a prohibited classification and will thus guard against the growth of a
"separate but equal" doctrine. 2 If this construction is adopted, it
would be unconstitutional to enact a statute which required an individual of either sex to adopt the surname of the other. However, even
if a state drafted a statute requiring one surname per married
couple, and left the choice of name to the couple, it is likely that the
weight of past custom would lead to the adoption of the husband's
surname. This type of indirect discrimination is difficult to eliminate
by legislative enactments alone, but courts could use the Equal Rights
Amendment to strike down supposedly neutral laws which have an
obviously discriminating impact.
The problem of formally neutral laws which may have a discriminatory impact arises under any law which attempts to eradicate discrimination based upon a single prohibited factor in a context where many other factors may legitimately be taken into account. The same issues have consistently appeared in the enforcement of laws prohibiting discrimination because of race, religion,
national origin, and labor organizing activity. The courts have responded by looking beyond the adoption of the "neutral" classifica•tion into the realities of purpose, practical operation, and effect.
'Where the classification is seen to be a subterfuge, or to nullify the
objectives of the anti-discrimination law, the courts have not hesitated
to strike it down.8s
Regardless of which construction the Court adopts, it is conceivable that passage of the Equal Rights Amendment might have no
effect on a married woman's right to her name. 4 Courts could obviate
the problem by declaring that there is no legally protected right ,to a
fiam6.S5

82. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 71, at 890.
83. Id. at 898-99.
84. The importance of the cooperation of the judiciary is stressed by Professor
Leo Kanowitz.
[W]ere the amendment adopted, it would have little or no effect upon existing
constitutional doctrine in the area of sex discrimination. Then, as now, the
crucial factor will continue to be the responsiveness of the judiciary to the
social impulse toward equality of treatment without regard to sex.
L. KANOWITZ, supranote 62, at 195.
85. A right to one's name may be seen as a "right of personality." The importance
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VI. CONCLUSION

Society, as it is presently constituted, imposes restrictions on
women which are not experienced by men. The usual explanation
for this denial of freedom of choice is that it is necessary for the
"existence and development of the race."' 0 A requirement that married women take their husbands' surnames serves as an agent for
preserving the present social structure. Unfortunately, this requirement imposes a burden solely on the married woman; it can be injurious to the development of her sense of identity and her concept of selfworth. Since the beneficial aspects of this system of appellation (e.g.,
agency efficiency, consistency in method of identification) are illusory,
this requirement should never be permitted to become a rule of law.
Married women should be allowed the same freedom with respect
to their identity as are married men. If a married woman prefers to
take her husband's name this should be her choice. It should require
an affirmative act on her part, rather than be a presumption that
this is what she prefers.
LINDA J. MEAD
of "rights of personality" have been expressed in many ways. Professor Sanford Kadish
has advocated that "rights of personality" should be taken into account in determining
due process standards.
The ideal of man's individuality, which, after all, is what infuses meaning
into the concept of freedom, is an emotional and personal as well as an
intellectual affair . . . . Where society's sanctioned procedures exhibit a disdain for the value of the human personality, the ideal is not likely to flourish.
Kadish, Methodology & Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey & Criticism,
66 YALE L.J. 319, 347 (1957). Accord, P. SELZNICK, LAv, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL
JUSTICE

255 (1959).

Mr. Justice Douglas considers "rights of personality" to come under first amendment protection and thus are absolute rights. Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 756, 757 (1973).
This comment has adopted the position that such a common law right exists, there is
also some basis for arguing that the Constitution confers and protects such rights.
86. Speech by Senator Ervin, United States Senate, Aug. 21, 1970, in Hearings,
.supranote 80, at 4.

